










Market Access Asymmetry in Food Trade  







Alessandro Olper and Valentina Raimondi 
Dipartimento di Economia e Politica Agraria, Agroalimentare  









Paper prepared for presentation at the XIth International Congress of the EAAE  
(European Association of Agricultural Economists),  
‘The Future of Rural Europe in the Global Agri-Food System’ 







Copyright 2005 by Alessandro Olper and Valentina Raimondi.  All rights reserved.  Readers 
may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.   2
MARKET ACCESS ASYMMETRY IN FOOD TRADE  
AMONG QUAD COUNTRIES 
 






This paper uses a gravity-like structure derived from a monopolistic competition model to 
measure market access among Canada, USA, Japan and EU – Quad countries – over the 
1996-2001 period. We explore the overall asymmetry and 18 food industrial-level 
asymmetries of bilateral trade openness. Using actual bilateral estimates of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers, we investigate their role in explaining the trade reduction effect of national 
borders. A representative estimate of market access shows that higher asymmetries exist in 
USA, Canada and EU trade with Japan. Quite surprisingly, the last country is always more 
open than the reverse. Finally, we found that tariffs and NTBs explain a significant part of the 
border effects and that the NTB role is often higher than that of tariff. 
 
Keywords: market access, food trade, asymmetry, gravity, QUAD countries 






This paper uses border effect estimation from a gravity equation to asses the level of market access 
in the food manufacturing trade among the United States, the European Union, Canada and Japan - the 
so-called Quad countries. The approach is based on a gravity-like structure derived from a 
monopolistic competition framework a la Krugman (see Head and Mayer, 2000; Feenstra, 2004).  
The estimation of market access through the border effect methodology - namely how much trade 
within countries is above international trade due to cross-border measures such as tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers and any other factors that might impede trade - offers different advantages with respect to 
direct protection measures, such as those based on observed tariff figures. For example, our indirect 
approach accounts for the important and often neglected fact that, for most products, most internal 
demand is met by domestic producers, not foreign ones. Thus an ideal protection index for foreign 
producers needs a benchmark based on the best possible market access situation, that is the one faced 
by national producers on the home market (Mayer and Zignago, 2005). This is exactly what the border 
effect approach tells us on comparing the relative volumes of intra versus international trade in two 
‘identical’ countries.  
Moreover, the border effect methodology captures all the trade impediments related to the 
existence of national barriers. This is a considerable advantage as most of these impediments are very 
hard to measure directly. For instance, consider the lack of reliable statistics on technical, sanitary and 
phytosanitary barriers, so pervasive in the agri-food market, and the conceptual difficulty to estimate 
their trade effect. By using an overall picture based on an indirect estimation approach we overcome 
these problems.  
Finally, the estimation of an overall market access index for sectors and countries characterized by 
a high degree of policy related barriers – like Quad food markets – can offer new insights into the 
growing literature that tries to understand why national borders matter so much for international trade 
(see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004 for a survey). Put differently, a contribution of the paper will 
be to assess how much trade policies, in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, are 
responsible for the strong trade reduction effect induced by national borders. Understanding this point 
appears critical due to its different economic and policy implications. Indeed, if the trade reduction   3
effect of crossing a national border is largely due to policy-unrelated border costs, such as transaction 
costs and/or consumer preferences for home goods, then the economic and policy implications of the 
border effect are quite low, at least from the perspective of trade policy reform. On the other hand, if 
the presence of the border effect is largely due to the existence of distortionary trade barriers, then the 
role of policy, and the potential welfare consequences, could, obviously, be quite different. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical and empirical framework. 
Section 3 describes the data sources and the variables used in the empirical model. Section 4 is 
devoted to the presentation of our empirical results. The final section discusses the main implications 
and our conclusions.     
 
2. Theoretical and empirical framework 
 
The estimation of border effect from gravity models, initiated by McCallum (1995), recently found 
a solid theoretical foundation in the work of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004). 
The gravity equation suggests that trade between two regions, after controlling for size, depends on the 
bilateral barrier between them, in relation to the average trade barriers that both regions face with all 
their trading partners. 
Our empirical framework consists of bilateral trade volume estimations with a gravity-like 
specification derived from the monopolistic competition model of trade introduced by Krugman 
(1980).  Although monopolistic competition is not the only available model that can be used to derive 
gravity equation, it seems the most natural when we consider trade among the Quad countries, the 
most industrialized countries in the world (Fontagné et al, 2005).   In this paper we use a gravity like 
structure introduced by Head and Mayer (2000). The model establishes a relation between the relative 
amounts consumers spend on foreign and domestic goods and their relative price net of transport costs.   
This model combines CES utility with iceberg costs and non strategic price setting behavior by 
firms. Thus, denoting mij the value of imports of country i from j, and mii  the value of imports of 
country i from itself, Head and Mayer (2000) show that the relative bilateral trade patterns can be 


















































     (1) 
 
where, vj is the exporter’s industry production value, aij  represents the i consumer preferences with 
respect to varieties imported from j, pj is the mill price in the exporter country and σ is the elasticity of 
substitution.  Finally, τij are the trade costs that determine the delivered price of the imported product 
(pij) as follows: 
 
     ( )( ) j ij ij ij ij j ij p ntb t d p p + + ≡ = 1 1
δ τ       ( 2 )  
 
In this specification, trade costs are a function of distance between countries (dij, which proxies for 
transport costs) and “border-related costs”.  Such costs, related to international trade policy, depend on 
the level of protection of the country i vs country j, and consist of an ad valorem tariff tij and the ad 
valorem equivalent of non-tariff barriers ntbij. These trade costs lead to rents for government and/or 
private beneficiaries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2002).  In the most general formulation, we assume 
that the structure of protection varies across all the partners’ pairs, and depends on the direction of the 
flow for a given pair as follows:  
 
( )( ) [ ] ij ij ij ij ij CANEU EUCAN EU ntb t φ ϕ η + + ≡ + + exp 1 1 .        (3) 
 
For simplicity purposes, equation (3) considers only trade between European countries and Canada, 
where EUij is a dummy variable set equal to 1 when i and j belong to EU (for i≠j), EUCANij is a   4
dummy variable set equal to 1 when i (≠j) belongs to EU and j is Canada, CANEUij is a dummy 
variable set equal to 1 when i is Canada and j(≠i) belongs to the EU. 
However, most border barriers result from factors unrelated to trade policy, and so do not generate 
rents such as consumer preferences aij. Such barriers are due to transaction costs generated by 
differences in language, culture, regulations, history, institutions (see Evans, 2003) and are, in most 
cases, more difficult to remove. Sharing a common language (L) and a common geographical border 
(C) is assumed to mitigate preferences for goods produced in the home country.  Thus, we have a 
‘home bias’ in preferences ( i β ), so that the consumer preferences (aij), the first term of equation (1), 
can be specified as follows: 
 
   ( )( ) [ ] ij ij ij ij ij i ij ij CANEU EUCAN EU C L e a + + − − − ≡ θ λ β exp      (4) 
 
where eij is a random component of preferences, Lij and Cij are dummy variables that take a value 1 
when country i and country j (for i≠ j) speak a common language and/or share a common border (0 
otherwise).  Consequently, if the two dummies switch from 0 to 1, home bias decreases from  i β  to 
( i β - i λ - i θ ). 
Replacing in (1) the trade cost specifications (2) and (3) and the consumer preferences (4) yields 
the following logarithmic form of the gravity equation: 
 










































ln 1 1 ln 1 ln ln σ θ σ λ σ σ    (5) 
              () ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ij ij i ij i ij i CANEU EUCAN EU ε φ β σ ϕ β σ η β σ + + − − + − − + − − 1 1 1  
 
Taking the antilog of the estimated dummy variables’ coefficients we estimate the so called border 
effect, namely how much intra-country trade is above to international trade after controlling for size, 
transport costs and relative prices.  The Border effect includes both the average level of protection of 
the importing country and the home bias of consumers (βi).  For example, the coefficient on EUCANij, 
(σ-1)(βi+ϕ), indicates the difficulty faced by Canadian exporters when selling its products to EU 
markets. Symmetrically, CANEUij equal to (σ-1)(βi+φ) indicates the difficulty European exporters 
have in accessing the Canadian market.  Comparing the coefficient permits the identification of 
possible asymmetries in market access.  Moreover, we can see that the level of protection of the 
importing country and the home bias of consumers influence the estimated border effect more when 
there is a high elasticity of substitution, σ. 
 
3. Data and measures 
 
Our gravity model includes 13 countries: United States, Canada, Japan and 10 European Union 
countries
1. The database considers the imports of the 13 Quad countries from all the other 13 Quad 
countries over the period 1996-2001 (see Appendix 1). The data set used presents a total of 15,591 
observations and considers the 33% of world food trade flows and the 52% of Quad country food 
imports from the world.  
The needed data involve, primarily, bilateral trade, production and intra-trade data in a comparable 
industry classification. The trade data come from the United Nations Commodity Trade Data Base 
(COMTRADE). These trade data are detailed official data, reported as export and import by 
commodity and partner countries and recorded according to six internationally recognized trade and 
tariff classifications. Here we consider the data reported by the importer countries, using the 
Harmonised System (HS96 6-digit) and then aggregate these data using the conversion table from 
HS96 (6-digit) to the International Standard Industrial Classification ISIC Rev.3 (4-digit). 
                                                 
1 The observations for Austria, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are not considered due to a 
large zero value in the production dataset.   5
This conversion allows full comparability between trade and production data at the food industry 
level.  Indeed, the output data come from the OECD Structural Statistics for Industry and Services 
database, that use ISIC Rev.3 at the 4-digit level, supplemented by other national sources in case of 
missing values. Our database considers the food manufacture trade and production data of 18 
industries (ISIC Rev. 3-4 digit, code 1511-1600
2).   
The empirical implementation of equation (5) needs intra-country trade data. However, these 
figures were not available for our country sample. Thus, as is common in the literature, a country’s 
‘imports’ from itself are calculated as in Wei (1996). The value of goods shipped from a country to its 
own consumers mii is equal to the overall production of the country minus its total exports. Both data 
come from the same sources described above.  
Moreover, we need measures of distance between and within countries. We use the intra-national 
distance estimate recently proposed by CEPII. This distance database has the considerable advantage 
of making internal distance constructions consistent with international distance calculations. Note that 
as is evident from the specification of trade costs (2), and as shown empirically by Head and Mayer 
(2002), any overestimate of the internal distance relative to the external one will mechanically 
translate into an overestimate of the border effect.  In the new CEPII database, the calculation is based 
on bilateral distances between cities weighted by the share of the city in the overall population of the 
country. This procedure is used for both internal and international distances.    
We take into account also whether or not two countries share a common border and a common 
language. Following Helliwell (1997), the two dummies take the value 1 when country i and country j 
(for i≠ j) speak a common language and/or share a common border (0 otherwise).  Those data come 
from the same CEPII database. 
 
Table 1. Tariff and AVE of NTB in QUAD countries. 
 
CAN EU USA JPN CAN EU USA JPN
Production, processing and preserving of meat 60.5 41.1 4.3 64.6 25.1 41.7 35.6 41.3
Processing and preserving of fish 1.8 13.1 2.6 5.7 13.5 26.0 20.1 23.3
Processing and preserving of fruit  6.0 20.1 7.8 14.9 15.7 47.3 33.4 43.4
Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils 9.2 10.7 5.6 6.8 4.5 32.8 3.7 19.5
Manufacture of dairy products 122.2 86.5 35.3 194.7 52.8 79.9 67.9 73.6
Manufacture of grain mill products 14.0 45.0 12.1 116.9 23.4 34.9 6.8 30.5
Manufacture of starches and starch products 7.3 56.1 25.0 96.6 27.5 61.0 0.0 49.3
Manufacture of prepared animal feed 40.9 81.2 64.5 11.8 0.0 47.6 0.0 19.4
Manufacture of bakery products 4.3 19.3 0.8 18.0 0.0 53.8 30.0 51.8
Manufacture of sugar 4.6 80.5 38.9 151.3 0.0 59.9 0.0 45.5
Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 28.5 26.1 17.8 38.8 0.0 68.5 4.6 39.3
Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar 5.2 20.4 4.6 20.6 0.0 66.6 53.4 44.0
Manufacture of other food products n.e.c. 34.8 12.6 15.7 51.7 14.1 63.7 47.0 42.7
Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 3.2 3.1 0.1 24.7 0.0 0.0 23.7 34.0
Manufacture of wines 11.0 8.0 8.5 39.1 0.0 0.0 9.9 9.7
Manufacture of malt liquors and malt 11.2 30.5 0.8 50.7 55.4 73.5 0.0 61.6
Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral water 28.4 10.2 11.0 8.2 0.0 53.4 10.4 41.7
Manufacture of tobacco products 8.3 41.8 60.8 16.5 0.0 30.5 0.0 0.0
Tariff NTB ave
 
Based on: UNCTAD’s TRAINS database, Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004) 
 
For relative prices the industry-level mill price required by the theoretical model is not used 
because of endogeneity concerns and low data availability.  Thus, following previous authors works, 
                                                 
2 1511 Production, processing and preserving of meat; 1512 Processing and preserving of fish; 1513 Processing 
and preserving of fruit; 1514 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils; 1520 Manufacture of dairy products; 
1531 Manufacture of grain mill products; 1532 Manufacture of starches and starch products; 1533 Manufacture 
of prepared animal feed; 1541 Manufacture of bakery products; 1542 Manufacture of sugar; 1543 Manufacture 
of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery; 1544 Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar; 
1549 Manufacture of other food products n.e.c.; 1551 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits; 1552 
Manufacture of wines; 1553 Manufacture of malt liquors and malt; 1554 Manufacture of soft drinks; production 
of mineral water; 1600 Manufacture of tobacco products.   6
we consider the more general price level of GDP, expressed relative to the United States.  The data 
come from the Penn World Tables v.6.1.   
Finally, with the objective of understanding the role played by policy related variables in 
explaining the border effect, we need data on tariff and NTB for the countries and industries involved 
in our analysis. Then tariffs come from UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. These data, available at the 
bilateral level at HS96-8 digit, are aggregated and converted to ISIC Rev. 3-4 digit using arithmetic 
means.  However, the tariffs between Canada and the US come from MAcMaps (Market Access 
Maps)
3 dataset, as the MFN tariff is zero in the preference scheme of TRAINS data.  For non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTB) we use NTB Ad Valorem Equivalent (AVE) estimated at the 6-digit level of the 
Harmonised System by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004)
4. These data are then aggregated and 
converted to ISIC Rev. 3-4 digit using arithmetic means. An extract of the tariff and AVEs of NTB 




4.1. Market access and asymmetries 
Table 2 presents ordinary least squares regressions of different specifications based on the gravity 
equation (5), pooled over the 1996-2001 period and across 18 food industry sectors.  Column (1) 
involves the whole sample, with a simple gravity equation where we estimate only one border, the 
Quad average border effect.  The overall fit of this regression is in line with the usual findings in 
gravity literature.  All the estimated coefficients have the expected sign and are highly significant 
(p<0.01).  The coefficient on relative production, equal to 0.8, is quite near the unitary value predicted 
by theory. The trade elasticity of relative distance, around -1.3, is also comparable with the usual 
findings in gravity equations. The relative prices are significant and negative, but only in this 
specification.   The coefficient on contiguity has a higher magnitude than usual while language is quite 
low and not very significant in this specification.   
This basic specification gives a quite large estimated border effect. It implies that, on average, each 
country trades around 63 times more (exp(4.14)) within its national border than with another Quad 
country.  Two countries sharing a common border have a border effect reduced from 63 to 17 
(exp(4.14-1.28)), everything else held constant.    
In column (2), we split the single border into 13 dummy variables, one for each of the possible 
combinations of the four Quad countries
5.  The border effect for intra-EU trade is quite large, with a 
coefficient over 4. This means that intra-country trade is, on average, 73 times larger (exp(4.28)) than 
crossing national border between EU countries.  A comparable estimate for aggregate food trade does 
not exist and a recent estimation for all manufactured good (Fontagné et al., 2005) finds an intra EU 
border effect of only 12.8 in the late nineties.  However, Head and Mayer (2000) found that intra EU 
border coefficients for most ‘ingestible products’ are higher than for non-food products, and range 
from 3.92 for dairy to 6.41 for sugar.   
Contrary to expectations, the border effect for intra-EU trade is not the lowest one among Quad 
countries.  Indeed, Japan’s market presents the easiest access level for imports from all the other 
considered countries, especially from the United States.  Moreover, Japanese exporters suffer from a 
constantly high level of border effect, evident not only in the US but also in the EU and Canadian 
markets.  This defines big asymmetries across the country-trade combinations evident in figure 1.  
Those results confirm previous findings, that the Japanese market is more open to imports from the 
USA than the reverse.  In particular, Fontagné et al (2005) consider that this ‘spectacular’ result might 
                                                 
3 MAcMaps is a bilateral and disaggregated measure of market access that has been constructed to integrate the 
major instruments of protection (ad valorem and specific duties, tariff rate) at the most detailed level (tariff 
lines), as well as all preferential regimes. 
4 To obtain these figures, the estimated at HS 6-digit level, the authors first estimate the impact of NTBs on 
imports using Leamer’s comparative advantage approach. They then transform the quantity impact into price 
equivalent, using import demand elastics.  
5 In agreement with previous literature (Fontagné et al., 2005; Mayer and Zignago, 2005), we dropped the 
regression constant so as to incorporate all the dummy variables for the estimation of each bilateral border 
coefficient.   7
be driven by an overestimate of the US-Japan distance, with respect to intra-EU distances. By contrast, 
Harrigan and Vanjani (2003) explain it by considering that the US has a proportionately larger demand 
for manufactured goods. However, another explanation could be related to differences in consumer 
‘home bias’, with a Japanese consumer preference bias towards foreign goods instead of domestic 
goods. From this perspective, future work is needed to explain the Japanese puzzle.  
 
Table 2. Border effects in the QUAD countries 
Dependent variable
Time period 1996-01 1996-01
Regression (1) (2)
Ln Yj/Yi 0.78 0.83
(0.01) (0.01)
Ln Distance ij/Distance ii -1.36 -1.06
(0.03) (0.04)









EU         EU -4.28
(0.07)
CAN          EU -5.60
(0.16)
EU          CAN -6.58
(0.11)
CAN          USA -4.55
(0.15)
USA         CAN -6.17
(0.15)
CAN         JPN -2.21
(0.25)
JPN         CAN -8.08
(0.24)
EU         JPN -3.57
(0.15)
JPN         EU -7.87
(0.17)
USA        EU -5.13
(0.14)
EU         USA -4.97
(0.10)
USA         JPN -1.40
(0.19)
JPN         USA -5.92
(0.22)
Adj R-square 0.405 0.502
# obs. 13,393 13,393
Ln (Imports / Intra-country trade)
 


























Figure 1. Market access asymmetry in QUAD country - border coefficients 
Notes: The figure is based on the results of regression (2) table 2.  
 
Flows between US and EU appear, on average, almost at the same impediment level. However, 
there exists a little higher ‘protection’ in the USA (vis-à-vis EU producers) than in the EU (vis-à-vis 
US producers). Although in contrast with common thinking the result is in line with previous findings, 
that estimate an asymmetry around one point for the food products border coefficient (Fontagné et al, 
2005). Finally, between Canada and the US, and Canada and the EU countries, asymmetries are quite 
strong.  In particular, the market access of Canadian products into European and American markets 
appears easier in our sample than the reverse.   
   
4.2. Industry level market access 
The estimation at the industry level allows us to evaluate the degree of symmetry in the Quad 
bilateral relationship for specific products. To this end, we split the 13 border coefficients estimate in 
regression (2) of table 2, into 234 (13 x 18) bilateral product-specific border coefficients. The 
regression results (not reported) present all the estimated border coefficients highly significant 
(p<0.01). The regression’s R-squared is 0.655.   
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Figure 2. Market access asymmetry between EU and USA – difference in border coefficients 
Notes: the figures 3 to 7 are reported in appendix 2.  
 
In figures 2 to 7 we present bilateral asymmetry in market access for the six different combinations 
of our sample. Following Fontagné et al. (2005), we plot those results using the difference in border 
coefficients for each industry in each country pair. For example, figure 2 identifies animal feed, fish,   9
and grain mill products as more ‘protected’ productions in the EU (vis-à-vis US producers) than in the 
USA (vis-à-vis EU producers). Reciprocally, dairy products and wine are more ‘protected’ in the 
USA.   
Finally, all 18 industry productions considered present large asymmetries in the market access of 
Canada, the EU and the USA with Japan. In particular, sugar, meat products, dairy products and 
distilled spirits are the four sectors with easier access to Japan, than the reverse (figs. 5-7). No 
analogous estimate for food industry sectors exists, however, Fontagnè et al. (2005), using 3-digit 
sectors, find similar asymmetries for the overall food products. Moreover, previous research on the 
perennially contentious US-Japan bilateral relationship find Japan more open to manufactured imports 
from the EU countries (Harrigan, 1996), as well as from the USA (Harrigan and Vanjani, 2003), than 
the reverse.  
 
4.3. The role of tariff and NTB in explaining border effect 
In previous regressions we estimated bilateral borders that derive from both policy and non-policy 
related barriers.  Now, let us try to answer to two more questions: how much of the border effect is due 
to policy related barriers? And, which kind of policy barriers are more protectionist, tariff or NTBs? 
Column (1) of Table 3 shows the results of basic regression estimated on 2000 data, without any 
tariff or NTB variable. Thus, it represents our benchmark to compare the effect of policy related 
barriers on estimated border effect. 
In regression (2) we introduce tariffs. The first result is that bilateral tariffs explain a not negligible 
part of the border effect.  Indeed, except among EU countries that have nil bilateral tariffs, border 
coefficients decrease in all country combinations, with an average border effect reduction of 27%
6.   
This result confirms previous findings, though the border effect is much larger. Indeed, Fontagné et al. 
(2005) find an average border effect reduction of 16% for manufactured trade goods and observe that 
the presence of tariffs increases the ratio of internal to cross-border trade volumes.  Moreover, the 
results of regression (2) show that tariffs explain 33% of the border coefficient for European imports 
coming from the USA and Canada, and 41% when imports come from Japan.  
Tariff coefficient is often used to estimate price elasticity (σ). From regression (2) the elasticity of 
substitution becomes equal to 2.48
7. This value is low but quite consistent with previous findings. For 
example, Fontagné et al. (2005) estimated an elasticity of substitution for manufactured goods that 
ranges from 1.96 to 3.79, depending on the specification.  Lopez and Pagoulatos (2002) find 1.59 as 
the mean value of elasticity of substitution for food manufacturing industries in the US market.  
Column (3) introduces the ad valorem equivalent of NTB as a protection variable. Once again there 
is a general decrease in border coefficient, except for intra-EU trade. The average border effect 
reduction of NTB is 30%, thus slightly higher than tariffs. On comparing the results with those of 
regression (2), it can be seen that the NTBs explain border effect more than tariffs do, for some 
country pairs. This result confirms the Kee et al. (2004) conclusions, that find aveNTBs often higher 
than tariffs imposed on the same product. In particular, NTBs represent 44% of the EU limits on 
market access (vis-à-vis US, Canada and Japan producers). By contrast, the estimated border effects of 
Canadian imports from Quad countries decrease more on introducing tariff, rather than NTB variables. 
Finally, in column (4) both the tariffs and the NTB are included, so we can estimate how much of 
the border effect is due to policy related barriers. It was found that, on average, 39% of the border is 
related to policy, but the higher level of the border policy component concerns access to the Japanese 
markets (over 50%). Policy related barriers represent 50% of the difficulty in accessing EU markets, 
while they represent less than 30% of the EU and Japanese exporters’ difficulty when selling products 
to the Canadian and USA markets. These results have important implications. Indeed, we found that 
for Canada and the USA the transaction cost differences between foreign and domestic products 
generates 70% of the border effects. This high border component can be caused partially by home-
                                                 
6 To calculate the average border effect reduction we first estimate border effect variation for each country-pair. 
For example, without any policy variables border effect of EU imports (vis-à-vis US producers) is equal to 
exp(5.40). Introducing the tariff variable, the border effect reduces to exp(4.99).  Thus, the variation of the 
European border is calculated as (exp(5.00)-exp(5.40))/exp(5.40) and is equal to -33%.  
7 In regression (2) (σ-1)= 1.48   10
bias, in preference, and partially by not-observed policy barriers such as safety regulations,  border 
costs that are, in most cases, quite difficult to remove.  
 
Table 3. The role of tariff and NTB in explaining border effect in the QUAD countries 
 Dependent variable
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Yj/Yi 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ln Distance ij/Distance ii -1.07 -1.07 -1.06 -1.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Common Language 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Contiguity 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.13
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Ln Prices -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Ln (1+Tariff) -1.48 -1.23
0.38 (0.40)
Ln (1+NTBave) -1.62 -1.09
(0.49) (0.51)
Bilateral Border coefficients
EU         EU -4.19 -4.19 -4.21 -4.21
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
CAN         EU -5.67 -5.26 -5.08 -4.94
(0.37) (0.39) (0.42) (0.42)
EU         CAN -6.43 -6.14 -6.25 -6.07
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
CAN         USA -4.37 -4.33 -4.11 -4.16
(0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.36)
USA         CAN -6.15 -6.05 -5.97 -5.95
(0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
CAN         JPN -1.94 -1.39 -1.45 -1.16
(0.51) (0.54) (0.53) (0.55)
JPN         CAN -8.05 -7.79 -7.89 -7.73
(0.61) (0.61) (0.62) (0.61)
EU         JPN -3.56 -3.04 -3.09 -2.81
(0.36) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40)
JPN         EU -7.84 -7.48 -7.27 -7.16
(0.43) (0.44) (0.47) (0.47)
USA        EU -5.40 -4.99 -4.82 -4.68
(0.36) (0.37) (0.40) (0.40)
EU         USA -4.63 -4.43 -4.37 -4.29
(0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
USA         JPN -1.45 -0.91 -0.99 -0.70
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
JPN         USA -5.73 -5.52 -5.49 -5.39
(0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52)
Adj R-square 0.520 0.524 0.523 0.526
# obs. 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300
Ln (Imports / Intra-country trade)
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The present paper applies the estimation of border effect from gravity models, initiated by 
McCallum (1995) and recently surveyed by Feenstra (2004) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).   11
The empirical analysis utilizes a gravity-like bilateral trade equation based on a comparison of inter-
national trade flows with intra-national trade flows. With this method we investigated the differences 
in market access difficulty among four industrialized country ‘blocs’: Canada, USA, EU and Japan. 
The analysis strongly confirms the existence of important asymmetry in food manufactured market 
access. 
The results on bilateral openness show that only the USA and the EU are more or less equally open 
to each other, while Japan seems to be more open to food manufactured imports from Quad countries 
than those countries are open to imports from Japan. This last result appears puzzling due to the long 
term recognition of high marked food protection in Japan. However, even though previous papers 
reached similar conclusions with respect to Japanese openness in manufacturing, the underlying (true) 
reason still calls for an explanation.   
Earlier results are also given in detail across industry. This has allowed the identification of food 
production where each country-pair presents higher asymmetry in relative market access.  
Finally, by introducing two policy variables (tariff and NTBs) into the model we found how much 
trade policies, in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, are responsible for the strong trade 
reduction effect induced by national borders. The results show that policy related barriers represent 
half, or more, of the export difficulties when selling food products to the EU or Japan, while they 
represent only 1/3 of the Canadian and USA border barriers. Moreover, the elasticity of  substitutions 
estimated by the model (σ = 2.48) tell us that imports and domestic food products are imperfect 
substitutes. Those results lead to different economic and policy implications. Indeed, for Canadian and 
USA imports, the trade reduction effect of crossing a national border appears to be more due to policy-
unrelated border costs, such as transaction costs, consumer preferences for home goods and/or not-
observed policy barriers. On the other hand, for the EU and Japanese imports, the presence of border 
effect seems more due to the existence of policy trade barriers.   12
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Appendix 1 
 
 Bilateral trade among QUAD countries (million US$) 
 
CAN-EU 1,535        1.6% 1,671      1.7% 1,706      1.8%
EU to CAN 980          64% 1,105      66% 1,148      67%
CAN to EU 554          36% 566         34% 558         33%
CAN-JPN 1,359        1.4% 1,255      1.3% 1,448      1.5%
CAN to JPN 1,329        98% 1,224      98% 1,417      98%
JPN to CAN 30            2% 31           2% 32           2%
CAN-USA 9,575        10.0% 11,388     11.7% 12,265     12.8%
CAN to USA 5,459        57% 6,771      59% 7,500      61%
USA to CAN 4,116        43% 4,617      41% 4,765      39%
EU-JPN 3,837        4.0% 3,851      4.0% 4,004      4.2%
EU to JPN 3,760        98% 3,779      98% 3,933      98%
JPN to EU 77            2% 72           2% 72           2%
EU-USA 8,964        9.3% 9,882      10.2% 9,897      10.4%
EU to USA 6,154        69% 6,951      70% 7,367      74%
USA to EU 2,810        31% 2,931      30% 2,530      26%
USA-JPN 9,856        10.2% 8,997      9.3% 9,702      10.2%
USA to JPN 9,479        96% 8,566      95% 9,248      95%
JPN to USA 377          4% 431         5% 454         5%
EU-EU 61,052       63.5% 60,169     61.9% 56,491     59.1%









Figure 3. Market access asymmetry between EU and Canada – difference in border coefficients 
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Note: all the estimated border coefficients are highly significant (p<0.01)   14
 
Figure 4. Market access asymmetry between USA and Canada – difference in border coefficients  
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Note: all the estimated border coefficients are highly significant (p<0.01) 
 
 
Figure 5. Market access asymmetry between EU and Japan – difference in border coefficients 
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Note: all the estimated border coefficients are highly significant (p<0.01) 
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Figure 6. Market access asymmetry between USA and Japan – difference in border coefficients 
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Figure 7. Market access asymmetry between USA and Japan – difference in border coefficients 
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Note:  all  the estimated border coefficients are highly significant (p<0.01), except Japan’s imports from Canada’s 
production, processing and preserving of meat (p=0.015). 
 